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Abstract
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models featuring imperfect competition and
nominal rigidities have become central for the analysis of the monetary transmission
mechanism and for understanding the conduct of monetary policy. However, it is agreed
that the benchmark model fails to generate the persistence of output and ination
that is observed in the data. Moreover, it cannot provide a theoretically well-grounded
justication for the interest rate smoothing behaviour of monetary authorities. This
paper attempts to overcome these deciencies by embedding a multiplicative habit
specication in a New Keynesian model. We show that this particular form of habit
formation can explain why monetary authorities smooth interest rates.
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1 Introduction
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models featuring imperfect competition
and nominal rigidities have become central for the analysis of the monetary transmission
mechanism and for understanding the conduct of monetary policy.1 However, it is agreed
that the benchmark model fails to generate the persistence of output and ination2 that is
observed in the data. Moreover, it cannot provide a theoretically well-grounded justication
for the interest rate smoothing behavior of monetary authorities. This paper attempts
to overcome these deciencies by embedding a multiplicative habit specication in a New
Keynesian (NK) version of the DSGE model.
The role of habits has a long tradition in economics, but the modern approach draws on
Becker (1992), and Carroll (2001) where habitual actions imply a positive relation between
past and present consumption.3 The interest in the role of habits has also been driven by its
ability to account for a number of anomalies in rst generation stochastic general equilibrium
models, such as the equity premium puzzle, identied by Mehra and Prescott (1985), Abel
(1990), and Campbell and Cochrane (1999). It has also been invoked to account for the
excess smoothness of consumption (Muellbauer (1988); Deaton (1992)).
In this paper we put habit formation to another use. In particular we show that a habit
formation model, suitably specied, can explain why monetary authorities smooth interest
rates. In order to do this, we follow Kozicki and Tinsley (2002) and adopt a geometric form
for the way in which the stock of habit accumulates from past consumption. This matters
because the use of an additive habit stock otherwise violates reasonable postulates of a
utility function. Wendner (2003) has shown that the multiplicative form of the habit term
in the utility function, recently employed by Carroll (2000), Amato and Laubach (2004) and
Fuhrer (2000) has some undesirable properties if the habit function is itself still additive.
This problem does not arise if the subtractive (linear) form of the habit term in the utility
function that was originally suggested by Muellbauer (1988) is used in combination with
an additive habit formation function. More recently Corrado and Holly (2011) have shown
1Examples include Clarida et al. (1999), Goodfriend and King (1997), McCallum and Nelson (1999), and
Woodford (2003b) among others.
2There have been numerous attempts to correct this shortcoming. Gali and Gertler (1999) argue that
if a fraction of rms set the price of their own good equal to the previous periods average reset price plus
the lagged ination rate then there will be inertia in ination; alternatively, Christiano et al. (2005) let a
fraction of rms increase their own prices in line with the lagged ination rate. Both have been criticized
for being ad hoc.
3Habit can be internal so it is a households previous consumption patterns that matter as in Fuhrer
(2000) and Christiano et al. (2005), or habit can be external so it depends on what other households are
also consuming as in Smets and Wouters (2007). Recently, Ravn et al. (2006) seek to di¤erentiate between
deephabits that form at the level of individual goods from those formed from a consumption basket (which
they denote supercial). Habits in this paper are of the supercial variety.
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that a geometric (multiplicative) process for habit formation addresses all the concerns that
Wendner (2003) has raised.
Many empirical studies of central bank behavior suggest that the interest rates set by
the monetary authorities move with a certain inertia in response to changes in economic
conditions.4 The Federal Reserve in the U.S., for example, gradually adjusts interest rates
to the level that is expected to keep the ination on target and to close the output gap.
While the empirical performance of the New Keynesian model is substantially improved by
the inclusion of a lagged-interest-rate in the monetary policy rule, a considerable debate
has arisen over the interpretation of such a modication in relation to optimizing behavior.
Models that incorporate a lagged interest rate as a determinant of the central banks reaction
function seem to be motivated mainly by a desire to rationalize the observed inertial character
of interest rates, rather than by any plausible account of why such an objective is actually
appropriate. We nd that the multiplicative habit specication in the New Keynesian model
can generate endogenous interest rate inertia. This nding is a step forward in explaining
why monetary authorities smooth interest rates.
Previous empirical literature, based on vector auto-regressions (VARs), documents persis-
tent hump-shaped responses of output and ination to monetary policy shocks, see Christiano
et al. (2005), and Smets and Wouters (2003) among others. The failure of the NK model
to replicate this feature of the data, is referred to as the persistence problem. As a means
of accounting for such a problem, some authors have augmented the benchmark framework
with potential sources of endogenous persistence. They have incorporated features such as
consumption habits, indexation to lagged ination in price-setting, rule-of-thumb behavior,
or various adjustment costs. Altig et al. (2010), Christiano et al. (2005), and Fuhrer (2000)
are prominent examples. As well as generating inertia in the setting of monetary policy,
our approach also signicantly improves the short run dynamics of the model. Multiplica-
tive habits can give rise to an endogenous backward looking term in the new Keynesian
Phillips curve, as well as the IS equation. In contrast to the existing literature, it is not
ination indexation that generates an aggregate supply relation with lagged ination, but
the consumers desire to smooth consumption in the face of an aspiration level generated by
consumption in the past.
One of the advantages of working with optimization-based models is that they facilitate
policy evaluation in terms of the welfare of private agents. Amato and Laubach (2004) and
Leith et al. (2012) are two examples of such models with habit formation mechanisms. To
perform policy analysis, this paper follows the methodology developed by Rotemberg and
4See Woodford (1999), Woodford (2003a) and the refrences therein.
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Woodford (1997), Benigno and Woodford (2003), and Woodford (2003b) in deriving the
central banks loss function as a second-order Taylor approximation to the habit-adjusted
utility of the representative consumer. The resulting quadratic welfare criterion depends
on ination, the current output gap, and lagged output; while the weights given to these
terms change with habit formation parameters. We also show that the model-driven loss
function includes additional quadratic terms involving quasi-di¤erences of output-gap that
are missing from the benchmark NK model. These extra terms capture the welfare losses
due to large changes in consumption growth rates at di¤erent time horizons.
We then turn to an analysis of the optimal policy problem, both when the monetary
authority can commit to a certain future path for ination and the output gap (optimal
policy with commitment) and when such commitment is not feasible (optimal policy with
discretion)5. Solving the central banks optimization problem under discretion, it is shown
that the monetary policy reaction function depends on lagged values of both ination and the
interest rate. This emerges because the representative consumer dislikes (i) large changes in
consumption relative to the level to which they aspire, and (ii) large changes in consumption
growth rates at di¤erent time horizons. The presence of a multiplicative habit stock alters
the standard policy conclusions of the canonical New Keynesian model in important ways.
First, the optimal discretionary policy cannot fully insulate the output gap and ination from
demand shocks, whereas under commitmentwhere a zero ination policy is optimalit still
can. Secondly, the optimal policy under commitment in response to a cost-push shock
produces signicantly di¤erent paths for ination and output compared to discretion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the NK model
with multiplicative habits. Section 3 derives a second order approximation to the utility
of the representative agent and uses this to dene the optimal policy problem under both
commitment and discretion. Section 4 describes the simulation exercise under a particu-
lar parameterization and analyzes the economys response to a demand/cost-push shock.
Finally, Section 5 summarizes the results and concludes.
2 A Structural Model with Habit Formation
This section employs a standard New Keynesian framework based on the optimizing behav-
ior of households and imperfectly competitive rms to analyze the consequences for optimal
monetary policy of multiplicative habits in consumption. First, the IS equation is derived
5The literature has settled upon this particular distinction between a discretionary policy and one with
commitment, but there is no reason why in place of a single period solution, we should compute a multiperiod
solution but with re-optimisation in each subsequent period. See Holly and Zarrop (1983).
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by combining the market clearing relation with the rst order optimality condition for con-
sumption, from a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function with a multiplica-
tive habit stock. Second, a supply equation is derived under the assumption that rms have
some monopolistic power, and face a constant probability of resetting prices each period, as
in Calvo (1983). The model is closed in Section 3 where we approximate the utility of the
representative consumer to obtain a quadratic loss function for the monetary authority and
to perform the policy analysis.
2.1 Households
The model economy is inhabited by a measure one continuum of households who consume
Dixit-Stiglitz aggregates of consumption goods6 and supply labor. Each household seeks to
maximize its expected lifetime utility from habit-adjusted consumption, /Ct = (Ct=H

t ) ; and
leisure over time,
E0
1X
t=0
t [U( /Ct)  V (Nt)] ; (2)
subject to a sequence of budget constraints given by
PtCt +QtBt = WtNt +Bt 1 + Tt; (3)
where Bt is the quantity of one-period nominal riskless discount bonds purchased in period t,
and maturing in period t+1. Each bond is priced at Qt and pays one unit of the numéraire
at maturity. Nt denotes hours of labour, Wt is the nominal wage, and Tt are net lump-sum
transfers/taxes. The period utility function in the households maximization problem takes
the following form
1
1  

Ct
Ht
1 
  Nt
1+'
1 + '
; (4)
where  measures the curvature of the utility function, ' 1 is the Frisch elasticity of labour
supply, and Ht represents the stock of habit, against which consumption in period t is eval-
uated. The parameter  measures the importance of the habit stock in the utility function:
6Such indexes are in turn given by CES aggregators of the quantities consumed of each type of good
(j):The optimal allocation of any given expenditure within each category yields the following demand func-
tion:
Ct(j) =

Pt(j)
Pt
 "
Ct; (1)
where Pt =
Z 1
0
Pt(j)
1 "dj
 1
1 "
is the price index for the consumption basket. The elasticity of substitution
between varieties within each category is given by " > 1.
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for example, if  = 0; only the absolute level of consumption matters, while if  = 1; then
consumption relative to the stock of habit matters. This functional form makes the utility
function time-non-separable, because a consumption choice today a¤ects future stocks of
habit. The reference level of consumption (the habit stock) can be expressed as a geometri-
cally weighted average of past consumption,
Ht = C
1 
t 1H

t 1:
This functional form corresponds to the multiplicative habit formation proposed by Koz-
icki and Tinsley (2002). With this formulation the consumer cares about, and forms habits
over, consumption growth rates instead of consumption levels. Such a specication is ap-
pealing in the light of the ndings of Wendner (2003) and Corrado and Holly (2011), who
have shown that an additive habit aggregator, Hat = (1   )Ct 1 + Hat 1, violates some
reasonable postulates of a utility function.7 The parameter  measures the strength with
which previous levels of consumption matter for current aspiration levels. In other words, 
indexes the persistence or memoryin the stock of habit. If  = 0, then only last periods
consumption is important. For 0 <   1, the larger is , the further back in time are levels
of consumption important for current consumption.
Corrado and Holly (2011) show that the four properties identied by Wendner (2003)
as reasonable features of a utility function are satised by the multiplicative form. Firstly,
an increase in the strength of habits, , with no change in current or past consumption,
reduces utility. This happens because the larger is  the less is the utility generated from
current consumption. Hence, habit forming consumers will postpone consumption, given
that consumers benet not only from consumption levels but also from consumption growth
(Deaton (1992)). Secondly, an increase in current consumption, with no change in past
consumption, and therefore no change in the habit stock, increases utility. Thirdly, an
increase in the habit stock with no change in current consumption reduces utility because
when a consumer becomes used to a given stock of habit, less utility will be derived from
a given amount of current consumption. Finally, an increase in the importance of a given
habit stock in period t, as measured by , requires a lower marginal rate of substitution
of Ct for Ct+1. Higher consumption today adds to the future habit stock which then lowers
future e¤ective consumption.
If we turn to the households optimization problem we have the following set of rst order
7For a recent review of habits in macroeconomics, see Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2008). Theoretical
foundations for several common representations of intrinsic habit formation are provided in Rozen (2010).
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conditions for Bt, Ct, and Nt, respectively (see Appendix A for more details).
Et

 Qt
Pt
t +

Pt+1
t+1

= 0; (5)
Et
(
Ut
Ct
  (1  )
Ct
nX
j=1
()j 1 Ut+j   t
)
= 0; (6)
  (Nt)' + tWt
Pt
= 0; (7)
where t is the Lagrangian multiplier on the t-period ow constraint, with t > 0. In what
follows, lower case letters denote log-deviations from the steady state and capital letters
indicate levels. Adopting this notation and log-linearizing (6), one obtains
  g0ct +
1X
j=1
gj(ct j + 
jEtct+j) = t; (8)
where the coe¢ cients are dened as
g0 =
   (1  )
h
(1 )(1 )
1 2
i
1  (1 )
1 
;
g1 =
 (1  )(1  ) [1  (1  )]
1  (1 )
1 
;
...
gj ' j 1g1:
We can easily see that equation (5) in its log-linear form reproduces the term structure
of interest rates.8 Formally,
t = Ett+1 + it   Ett+1 + log ; (9)
in which it    logQt is the short-term nominal interest rate. Denoting the equilibrium
deviations of the short-term real interest rate by rt = it   Ett+1 + log , and solving (9)
8Clearly if there is no habit, g0 = , where  measures the concavity of the utility function, and gj = 0,
for j = 1;1.
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forward yields
t =
1X
i=0
Etrt+i '
n 1X
i=0
Etrt+i = nEtt; (10)
where t is the ex-ante real interest rate on an n-period bond. It is assumed that the innite
sum in (10) is nite for stationary real rate deviations. In other words, after n periods
the interest rate converges to its long term value. Combining the log-linearized rst order
condition for consumption, (8), with (10), and using the market clearing condition yt = ct,
Et
(
g0yt  
1X
j=1
gj(yt j + 
jEtyt+j) + nt
)
= 0:
In order to get this complicated expression into a more manageable form, we can express
the innite backward and forward summations above in terms of L; the lag operator, so
Liyt = yt i, and F , the lead operator, so F iyt = yt+i, as:
Et

g0yt + g1
yt 1 + yt+1
1 + 2    (L+ F ) + nt

= 0;
which can be further simplied to obtain a dynamic IS equation in the presence of multi-
plicative habits,
yt = 1 (yt 1 + Etyt+1)  2nt + 3n(t 1 + Ett+1); (11)
where 1 =
1
1+2

   g1
g0

, 2 =
1
g0
, and 3 =

g0(1+2)
. The crucial point here is that
current output now depends on lagged output and the lagged interest rate as well as current
and forward terms.
It is straight-forward to show that (11) reduces to the standard IS equation in the absence
of consumption habits, i.e., when  =  = 0, then:
yt = Etyt+1   1

(it   Ett+1 + log ) =   1

1X
i=0
Etrt+i =  n

Ett: (12)
2.2 Firms
The model economy presented here consists of a continuum of households, each of which
is a monopolistic supplier of one di¤erentiated product. Suppliers face a downward sloping
demand schedule for their goods, given by (1), which they produce using a linear production
function.
Yt(j) = Nt(j): (13)
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Assuming a symmetric equilibrium across all rms, the rst order log linear approxima-
tion of the aggregate production function can be written as
yt = nt: (14)
Final goods producers are assumed to set prices in a staggered fashion, as in Calvo (1983).
Each period a fraction (1  ) of suppliers, drawn randomly and independently of their own
history, are able to adjust their prices in response to uctuations in demand; whereas the
rest, , have to keep their prices unchanged. Denote P optt (j) as the optimal price set by agent
j in period t. Since all suppliers that reset their prices in any given period will choose the
same price as they face similar demand functions, one can drop the j subscript. The optimal
price setting then requires solving the following equation:
Et
1X
k=0
()k
(
t+k

P optt
Pt+k
 "
Yt+k
P optt
Pt+k
  ~V
"
P optt
Pt+k
 "
Yt+k
#)
; (15)
where ~V [Yt (j)] = V [Nt (j)] = V (f 1 [Nt (j)]). The rst term in brackets represents the
households utility from consumption in period t + k if price P optt is chosen in the current
period. It is the product of revenue (expressed in consumption units) in period t + k,
conditional on price being P optt ; and the marginal utility of consumption, t+k. The second
term represents the marginal disutility from supplying the amount of products in demand
during period t+k if price is still P optt . It is easy to convert this term into units of an equivalent
quantity of the consumption aggregate to obtain the real marginal cost and subsequently to
rewrite (15) in terms of the rms lifetime prots as in Galí (2008). Finally, since the price
chosen in period t will remain unchanged k periods ahead with probability k, the household
discounts the stream of future utilities conditional on its choice of price today by .
Combining the law of motion for the aggregate price index with (8), and an expression for
P optt (derived from a suppliers maximization problem) provides the hybrid NKPC. Derivation
details are given in Appendix B.
t =
1
2 + 3
Et
8><>:
 [(1 + '2) yt   (1 + '3) (yt 1 + yt+1)]
+ (2 + 3) t+1 + 3
 
t 1   2t+2

9>=>; ; (16)
where  = (1 )(1 )
(1+'")
: One can easily verify that the augmented aggregate supply relationship
in (16) reduces to the standard NKPC equation in the absence of consumption habits,
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 =  = 0,
t = Ett+1 +  ( + ') yt:
In the canonical model the slope of the Phillips curve depends on both the curvature of
the utility function with respect to consumption and leisure/labour supply, the extent of im-
perfectly competitive markets, and the stickiness of price setting. With an aspiration/habit
level of consumption, equation 16 contains lagged and expected future output, because ex-
pected marginal revenues are now valued by the shadow-price of consumption, t, which
depends on current output and all its historical values. This e¤ect of habit formation on the
aggregate supply side is absent from the model of Fuhrer (2000) featuring an additive habit
stock. What is also di¤erent from the existing literature is that t 1 and Ett+2 now enter
the Phillips curve endogenously as a by-product of the Euler equation on the demand side of
the model. It is the consumers intertemporal consumption-labour choice via the marginal
utility of consumption that gives rise to this hybrid NKPC.
3 Optimal Monetary Policy
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Woodford (2003b) show that under certain conditions,
a second order Taylor approximation to the expected present discounted value of the utility
of the representative household is related inversely to a conventional quadratic loss function
in ination and the output gap.
3.1 The Quadratic Approximation to Welfare
We show in Appendix C how the central banks objective function in the presence of con-
sumption habits is derived as a second order approximation to the representative households
welfare. It is assumed that appropriate subsidies are in place such that the steady-state level
of output is e¢ cient despite the presence of imperfect competition (see Galí (2008), Ch. 5).9
Therefore, monetary policy has no inationary bias in this model.
W   1
2
E0
1X
t=0
t

"
 (1 + '")
2t   (1  ) (yt   ht)2 + (1 + ')y2t

: (17)
9Raissi (2011) discusses the implications of relaxing this assumption for the conduct of optimal monetary
policy in a New Keynesian model with search and matching frictions.
9
The habit stock, in its log-linear form, is expressed as
ht = (1  )yt 1   ht 1 (18)
=
(1  )
1  Lyt 1:
where L is the lag operator.
In contrast to the time-separable utility case without habits in consumption, the welfare
criterion (17) depends not only on current output but also on output in the past. Quasi-
di¤erences of output, yt ht, appear in the period loss function because of the intertemporal
consumption linkages via multiplicative habits. In a very simple case in which the reference
level of habit is tied to only one period of past consumption,  = 0, and when  = 1, the
welfare criterion becomes:
W   1
2
E0
1X
t=0
t

"
 (1 + '")
2t   (1  )y2t + (1 + ')y2t

;
in which the policy maker not only seeks to stabilize the output-gap, yt, but also it tries
to reduce the variability of output growth, yt. The latter reduces welfare because of the
dependence of the current shadow price of consumption on past consumption. As in the new
Keynesian model, ination also reduces utility because it leads to an ine¢ cient composition
of (habit-adjusted) consumption for a given level of output, due to the dispersion of relative
prices. That is, even if total habit-adjusted consumption is equal to the e¢ cient level, up
to a rst order, the composition of consumption across individual goods is ine¢ cient in the
presence of ination (due to price stickiness).
In the absence of habit formation,  =  = 0, the above welfare function collapses to
W =  1
2
E0
1X
t=0
t

"
 (1 + '")
2t + ( + ') y
2
t

; (19)
which is the utility-based criterion derived in Galí (2008).
3.2 Optimal Policy under Discretion
The optimal monetary policy problem is set out in this section for the case of discretion, i.e.
where the central bank makes an optimal decision each period without committing itself to
any future paths for ination and output. Under discretion, the policy maker is unable to
inuence private sector expectations about future ination. This implies the policy problem
simplies to a sequence of static optimizations. More specically, each period the central
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bank is assumed to choose (yt, t) in order to minimize the single-period losses
"
 (1 + '")
2t   (1  ) (yt   ht)2 + (1 + ')y2t (20)
subject to the ination adjustment equation (16). The optimality condition for the problem
above is given by
yt =   "
 (1 + '") ( + ')
t
@t
@yt
;
yt =   t; (21)
where  = "
(1+'")(+')

1+'2
2+3

and t = 1; 2; ::: Condition (21), as noted in Clarida et al.
(1999) andWoodford (2003b), has a simple interpretation: in the face of inationary pressure
resulting from a cost-push shock (for example), the central bank must respond by driving
output below its e¢ cient level thus creating a negative output gap with the objective of
dampening the rise in ination. The central bank carries out such a lean-against-the-wind
policy up to the point where this condition is satised.10
By replacing (21) in (11), one can derive a relationship for the ex-ante long-term interest
rate as a function of ination, or the monetary policy rule,
t =
 
n2
t    1
n2
(t 1 + Ett+1) +
3
2
(t 1 + Ett+1): (22)
What is di¤erent in (22) from the previous literature is the interest rate smoothing be-
havior of the central bank. t 1 enters the monetary policy reaction function endogenously,
resulting in a gradual adjustment of the interest rate in response to shocks. To understand
the deriving force behind this result, recall that the utility of the representative household
depends on current consumption divided by a stock of multiplicative habit. Endogenous
interest rate smoothing arises in the present model as a result of this particular habit spec-
ication. This inertia in the interest rate rule will disappear if the habit form is additive.
Under Fuhrers specication, where the reference level of habits is tied to only last periods
consumption, Hat = Ct 1, the interest rate does not respond to (t 1 + Ett+1) at all, be-
cause  = 0 and so is 3. Section 4 shows how this modication,  > 0, a¤ects the dynamics
of the model under a standard calibration.
The monetary policy rule can be equivalently formulated as a function of the one-period
real interest rate, rt = it   Et (t+1), or the innite horizon sum of expected real policy
10Note also that if we think about this optimality condition in terms of the e¢ cient policy frontier of
Taylor (1979), then it corresponds to just one point on the frontier determined by the degree of imperfect
competition (captured by ") and the intertemporal elasticity of labour supply (inverse of ').
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rates,
P1
i=0Etrt+i, approximated by a long-term ex ante real bond rate, nEtt.
11 The latter
option is adopted in equation (22). It should be noted that under the assumption of rational
expectations, the choice of the one-period policy rate or the n-period bond rate is irrelevant
because either formulation is consistent with the simulated predictions of the full model.
To nd a relationship between the short-term and the long-term interest rate in simu-
lations, this paper follows Fuhrer and Moore (1995), and makes use of the intertemporal
arbitrage condition that equalizes the expected real holding-period yields on a long-term
bond and the short-term monetary instrument. The latter can be approximated by
t = n

Et
 
t+1
  t	+ fit   Et (t+1)g ; (23)
where n represents the duration of the bond, which is assumed to be ten years, i.e. n = 40
at a quarterly rate. Using (23), any change in the short-term rate is transmitted to the
long-term real interest rate over n periods. Solving equation (23) for t in terms of t+1 and
it   Et (t+1), then recursively substituting the result into itself, the long term real rate is
an exponentially weighted average of the forecast path of the real short term interest rates.
t =
1
1 + n
1X
j=0

n
1 + n
j
Et (it+j   t+j+1) ' 1
n
n 1X
j=0
Etrt+j:
It should be noted that in a canonical new Keynesian model without habits, yt =   "1+'"t,
and the monetary policy rule in terms of t or rt+j, j = 0; 1; :::;1 can be written as
t =
"
n(1+'")
t ,
P1
j=0Etrt+j =
"
1+'"
t:
3.3 Optimal Policy under Commitment
Discretion in setting monetary policy can lead to the so-called "stabilization bias" where
output is over-stabilized while ination is too volatile, and thus can result in lower welfare
than under commitment. This bias is strictly a dynamic phenomenon, describing the econ-
omys transition path toward its asymptotic equilibrium (from the initial state) and which
depends on whether or not the monetary authority can precommit to a policy plan. This
section lays out the central banks optimization problem in the presence of multiplicative
habits under the assumption that the monetary authority can commit to a certain future
path of ination and output. It illustrates the e¤ects of "forward-looking expectations"
and "the future habit reference levels" for the model dynamics. Under commitment, the
11As pointed out by Kozicki and Tinsley (2002).
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optimal policy consists in choosing a state contingent sequence fyt; tg1t=0 that minimizes
the intertemporal model-driven loss function, (17), subject to the private sectors optimal
behavior, as summarized in equations (11) and (16), and given a law of motion for the habit
stock, (18). As illustrated in Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003b), the optimal policy
under commitment implies some inertia in which the policy maker can take full advantage
of the forward-looking plans of the representative agent, as well as the link from current
consumption to the future shadow prices of consumption (or habit stocks).
4 EquilibriumDynamics (Discretion vs. Commitment)
To explore the monetary policy reaction under optimal discretion and commitment, the
model is calibrated and solved numerically.12 The economys responses to an exogenous
demand shock and a cost-push disturbance are then compared under two di¤erent habit
forming mechanisms. The rst (solid lines) corresponds to the additive habit specication
of Fuhrer (2000), in which  = 0, while the other (dashed lines) represents the multiplicative
habit stock used in this paper, where  = 0:5.
4.1 Calibration
The baseline quarterly calibration of the model parameters to U.S. data is summarized in
Table 1. The discount factor  is set to the conventional value of 0:99, which corresponds to
a riskless annual return of about 4%. The parameter ", the elasticity of substitution among
di¤erentiated goods, is set equal to 7:88. This reads into a mark-up of prices over marginal
costs of 14%. The degree of price stickiness, measured by , is set equal to 0:75, which
implies an average frequency of price adjustment of four quarters. Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997) argue that a 14% markup is a plausible value to be consistent with rms engaging in
staggered price adjustments.
The coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion  is usually assumed to take values in the interval
[1; 6]; see Chari et al. (1997). Estimates of  based on aggregate consumption data by Hall
(1988) suggests a value of 3; while Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) provide an estimate
of 0:16, which they obtain by matching their models impulse response functions to those
obtained from a VAR using U.S. data. As they point out, their low estimate of the relative
risk aversion coe¢ cient is related to the fact that  measures the interest rate sensitivity of
total output, not just that of nondurable consumption. In the absence of habits,  =  = 0,
12See Soderlind (1999) for more details. All the simulations are performed in Dynare 4.3.0. and the codes
are available upon request.
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Table 1: Parameter Values
Discount factor  0:99
Coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion  2
Elasticity of substitution across goods " 7:88
Price adjustment probability 1   0:25
Inverse elasticity of labour supply ' 3
Habit strength in utility function  0:8
Habit persistence (memory)  0:5
Duration of long-term bonds n 40
the parameter  in the present model has the same interpretation as in Rotemberg and
Woodford (1997), implying that a low value would be of greater relevance. However, a
value exceeding 1 is necessary for a positive e¤ect of past consumption on current marginal
utility, which captures the essence of habit formation. For this reason, in the preferences
specication,  is set to 2.
The parameter ' is set to 3 as in Galí and Monacelli (2005). This parameter measures
the curvature of the disutility of labor and implies a Frisch labour supply elasticity of 1=3.
Finally, the value of the strength of habits in the utility function, , is set to 0:8 based on the
estimates of Fuhrer (2000). Since this paper focuses on exploring the e¤ects of multiplicative
habits, Sections 4.2 and 4.3 report the impulse responses for two values of . Specically,
this paper considers the additive case corresponding to Fuhrer (2000) where,  = 0, and the
multiplicative specication of Kozicki and Tinsley (2002) in which  = 0:5 (the geometric
form used in this paper).
4.2 Impulse Responses under Discretion
To illustrate graphically the e¤ects of multiplicative consumption habits under a discre-
tionary monetary policy, a simulation exercise is performed using the key log-linearized
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relations derived in Sections 2 and 3.2, namely
yt = 1 (yt 1 + Etyt+1)  2nt + 3n(t 1 + Ett+1); (24)
t =
1
2 + 3
Et
8><>:
 [(1 + '2) yt   (1 + '3) (yt 1 + yt+1)]
+ (2 + 3) t+1 + 3
 
t 1   2t+2

9>=>; (25)
t =
 
n2
t    1
n2
(t 1 + Ett+1) +
3
2
(t 1 + Ett+1) (26)
t = n

Et
 
t+1
  t	+ fit   Et (t+1)g (27)
where (24) is the dynamic IS relationship, (25) represents the hybrid NKPC, (26) is the
discretionary policy rule derived from the utility-based welfare function and (27) is the
equilibrium relationship between the short-term and the long-term real interest rates.13
Figure 1 plots the impulse responses of ination, output and interest rates to a positive
cost-push disturbance (which is added exogenously to the NKPC) under a discretionary
optimal policy for the canonical new Keynesian model as well as for two di¤erent habit
forming mechanisms. Note that the shock is one-o¤. There is no autocorrelation in the
shock itself, so any persistence is completely endogenous. Clarida et al. (1999) show that
the introduction of an ad hoc, exogenous cost-push shock allows the new Keynesian model
to generate a meaningful policy problem in which there is a trade-o¤ between stabilizing the
ination rate and reducing the output-gap. Following the shock, output falls and ination
increases initially due to the higher costs of production. However, geometric habits slow
down the adjustment of the price level and generates a more muted response in output
compared to the additive case. This is reected in an ination response that is both smaller
on impact and more persistent afterwards. Furthermore, ination, output, and the short
and long term interest rates all display hump-shaped responses. For both habits the initial
short term interest rate response is negative, though it is positive for the canonical model.
Another feature of the results that stands out is the much smoother and humped-shaped
adjustment of interest rates under multiplicative habits reecting the inertia in the response
of the monetary authorities to shocks. It is clear that a habit e¤ect slows adjustment down
13It is often argued in the empirical macroeconomics literature that economic theory only tells us something
about the long run, and nothing about short run dynamics. But it is clear from equations 24 to 27 that the
dynamics of the model are directly a function of the structural parameters.
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compared to the canonical new Keynesian model, but that the adjustment process is both
much slower with multiplicative habits, and hump-shaped.
Figure 2 plots the impulse responses to a unitary demand shock under the three cases.
A common conclusion from the New Keynesian literature is that shocks to the forward-
looking IS curve can be neutralized by the central bank, so that neither ination nor the
output gap deviate from their exible-price equilibrium. But here, by contrast, the optimal
discretionary policy, with either additive or multiplicative habits, does not fully insulate
the output gap and ination from demand shocks. This result arises because the future
habit stock is a¤ected when current output changes, since the law of motion for habit is
given by ht+1 = (1   )yt   ht. However, ht+1 does not appear in the single period,
discretionary, loss function. Because of the dampening e¤ect of habit, interest rates cannot
respond su¢ ciently robustly to choke o¤ fully the e¤ects of the demand shock. So both
output and ination rise. The immediate jumps in ination and output are similar for the two
habit formation cases, while the subsequent adjustments are quite di¤erent. With additive
habits, ination returns to steady state after two periods, while ination with multiplicative
habits is much more persistent. The monetary authority in both cases responds to the higher
rate of ination by increasing the short-term interest rate. However, under multiplicative
habits the responses of the short-term policy rate and the long term rate exhibit more inertia
compared to additive habits. With the canonical model, it only requires a one period change
in interest rates to neutralize the e¤ect of the shock to demand. Sharp changes in the
policy rate are discouraged by the need to smooth output levels and growth rates under the
multiplicative habit specication. Finally, the movement in the short term rate is ultimately
transmitted to the long-term real interest rate through equation (23).
4.3 Impulse Responses under Commitment
We provide a similar set of simulations to section 4.2 but now with optimal commitment
where expectations and future habit reference levels are taken into account. In particular,
we minimize the intertemporal loss function, (17), subject to the log-linearized equilibrium
conditions, (11), (16), and (18).14 Because, compared to the discretionary case, the optimal
policy is forward looking, ination in Figure 3 is much better anchored when there is a cost
shock. However, this is at the expense of a slower adjustment of output. This outcome
is achieved by a cut in short term interest rates, with this not been reversed until the
third or fourth period. In Figure 4 we show responses to a demand shock. In contrast to
the discretionary case, we now nd that monetary authorities can neutralize the e¤ect of
14In this case, the optimized rule cannot be derived analytically.
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the demand shock on ination and output with habits. This is achieved by a one-period
rise in the interest rate for the canonical new Keynesian model and for the additive habit
specication. However, there is a considerably smoother response of the short term interest
rate with multiplicative habits.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has incorporated a multiplicative habit specication into a New Keynesian model
to study its implications for optimal monetary policy and model dynamics, as well as to
explain the interest rate smoothing behavior of monetary authorities. The log-linearized
version of the model is shown to consist of a generalized IS equation, a hybrid new-Keynesian
Phillips curve, and a monetary policy reaction function with an endogenous backward-looking
component. All of these equations contain extra lag and lead terms that produce hump-
shaped dynamics typically seen in estimated VARs. Interest rate inertia is also shown to
be present when the stock of habits in the consumers utility function is expressed as a
geometrically weighted average of past consumption. The presence of multiplicative habits
with a long memory also generates a substantial increase in the persistence of output and
ination following a demand shock.
We also derived an explicit second-order approximation to the welfare of the representa-
tive agent in the presence of multiplicative habits. The resulting model-driven loss function
includes additional quadratic terms involving quasi-di¤erences of output-gap that are miss-
ing from the standard NK loss function. These extra terms capture the welfare losses due to
large changes in consumption growth rates at di¤erent time horizons and are very important
for optimal monetary policy analysis. Multiplicative habits alter the central banks optimal
policy response in important ways. First, under discretion, the output gap and ination
uctuate in response to demand disturbances even when the central bank is setting policy
optimally; whereas, under commitment, shocks to the demand are neutralized (they do not
a¤ect neither the output gap nor the ination). Second, the presence of multiplicative habits
may give rise to additional stabilization biases where the optimal policy, either under com-
mitment or discretion, cannot stabilize the output-gap and ination simultaneously in the
face of a cost-push shock.
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Appendix A: First Order Condition for Consumption
Beginning with the denition of period utility
Ut =
1
1  

Ct
Ht
1 
;
the overall utility function
U = Ut + Ut+1 + :::
and the habit-formation reference consumption level
Ht = C
1 
t 1H

t 1:
The derivative of U with respect to Ct is
@U
@Ct
=
@Ut
@Ct
+
@Ut
@Ht
@Ht
@Ct
+ 
@Ut+1
@Ht+1
@Ht+1
@Ct
+ 2
@Ut+2
@Ht+2
@Ht+2
@Ct
:::
Noting that
@Ut
@Ct
= (1  ) Ut
Ct
;
@Ut
@Ht
=  (1  )Ut
Ht
;
@Ht+i
@Ct
= i 1 (1  ) Ht+i
Ct
;
then we can write:
@U
@Ct
= (1  ) Ut
Ct
  (1  ) (1  )
Ct
1X
i=1
()i 1 Ut+i:
Combining this with (3) in a Lagrangian, we obtain the rst-order condition (6).
Appendix B: The Hybrid NKPC
The rst step in deriving (16) is to take the partial derivative of (15) with respect to P optt
and approximate it around the steady state,
Et
1X
k=0
()k
(
t+k + p
opt
t  
kX
i=1
t+i   '
"
yt+k   "
 
poptt  
kX
i=1
t+i
!#)
= 0; (28)
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where poptt = log

P optt
Pt

; and ' = yy(Y ;0)Y
y(Y ;0)
. In the special case in which prices are exible,
 = 0, and because all rms choose the same price, poptt would be zero. Therefore (28)
simplies to the condition that
t = 'yt:
In the general case where some rms cannot adjust their prices, i.e.  > 0, an expression
for poptt can be derived by substituting from (8) for t in (28), or
poptt = (1  )Et
1X
k=0
()k
8><>: 11 + '"
264 g1
yt+k 1+yt+k+1
1+2 (L+F )
+(g0 + ') yt+k
375+ kX
i=1
t+i
9>=>; : (29)
From
Pt =
Z 1
0
Pt(j)
1 "dj
 1
1 "
;
the average price in period t satises the following law of motion
Pt =
h
 (Pt 1)
1 " + (1  )  P optt 1 "i 11 " :
Log-linearizing this equation yields
poptt =

1  t: (30)
Furthermore, the double sum in (29) can be simplied as
1X
k=0
()k
kX
i=1
t+i =
1
(1  )
" 1X
k=0
()kt+k   t
#
: (31)
Substituting (30) and (31) into (29), and expressing the resulting expression in recursive
form yields
t = 

(g0 + ') yt + g1
yt 1 + Etyt+1
1 + 2    (L+ F )

+ Ett+1 + t;
where  = (1 )(1 )
(1+'")
and t is a cost-push shock.
One can further simplify the above equation to complete the specication of ination
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dynamics in (16).
t =
1
2 + 3
Et
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
 [(1 + '2) yt   (1 + '3) (yt 1 + yt+1)]
+ (2 + 3) t+1 + 3
 
t 1   2t+2

 2t + 3
 
t 1 + t+1

9>>>>>>=>>>>>>;
Appendix C: Second Order Expansions
To drive a second order approximation to the representative households welfare, it is nec-
essary to introduce some additional notation. Let x = log
 
Xt
X

be the log deviation of any
variable Xt around its steady-state value X. The following second order approximation of
relative deviations in terms of log deviations is frequently used below,
Xt  X ' X

xt +
1
2
x2t

+O3;
where Ok indicates terms of order k   th and higher in the size of the shocks. We assume
that the average utility ow of the representative household follows
U( /Ct)  V (Nt) =
1
1   /C
1 
t  
Nt
1+'
1 + '
;
where /Ct =

Ct
Ht

is the habit-adjusted level of consumption. Taking a second order Taylor
series expansion to the rst term, U( /Ct), yields
U( /Ct)  U ( /C) ' U /C ( /Ct   /C) +
1
2
U /C /C ( /Ct   /C)
2 +O3:
In terms of log deviations,
U( /Ct)  U ( /C) ' U /C /C

/ct +
1
2
/c2t

+
1
2
U /C /C /C
2

/ct +
1
2
/c2t
2
+O3:
Further simplication, using the fact that    
U /C /C
U /C
/C, gives a more compact represen-
tation,
U( /Ct)  U ( /C)
U /C /C
' /ct +
1
2
(1  ) /c2t +O3; (32)
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where /ct = ct   ht = ct   (1 )1 L ct 1.
The next step is to approximate the disutility of labour following Galí (2008).
V (Nt)  V (N) ' VN (Nt  N) + VNN
2
(Nt  N)2 +O3;
which can be rewritten as
V (Nt)  V (N) ' VNN(nt + 1
2
n2t ) +
VNNN
2
2
n2t +O
3: (33)
Assuming a constant return to scale technology, the aggregate level of labour, Nt, evolves
according to
Nt = Yt
Z 1
0

Pt(i)
Pt
 "
di:
Log linearizing the above expression around the zero-ination steady state yields
nt = yt +t;
where t = log
Z 1
0

Pt(i)
Pt
 "
di is a measure of price dispersion. Galí (2008) shows that t is
proportional to the cross sectional variance of relative prices,t = "2V ari [Pt(i)] and therefore
of second order. Furthermore, the expression V (Nt) =
N1+'t
1+'
, implies that ' = VNN
VN
N , and
then equation (33) becomes
V (Nt)  V (N) ' VNN(nt + 1
2
(1 + ')n2t ) +O
3
' VNN

yt +
1
2
(1 + ')y2t +t

+O3;
where the last line makes use of the fact that 2t and tyt are of order four and three
respectively. Finally using the steady state relationship U /C /C =  VNN , we arrive at the
following expression
  V (Nt)  V (N)
U /C /C
' yt + 1
2
(1 + ')y2t +
"
2
V ari [pt(i)] +O
3: (34)
Adding (34) to (32) and rearranging terms yields the following utility based welfare
criterion
U( /Ct)  V (Nt)
U /C /C
'  1
2

"V ari [pt(i)]  (1  ) /c2t +
1
2
(1 + ')y2t

+O3 + t:i:p:;
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in which t:i:p: represents terms independent of policy. Forming the expected sum E0
P1
t=0 
t
and rearranging terms across summands yields a second order approximation to the con-
sumers welfare losses expressed as a fraction of steady state consumption,
W   1
2
E0
1X
t=0
t

"
 (1 + '")
2t   (1  ) /c2t + (1 + ')y2t

;
in which we have used the fact that
P1
t=0 
tV ari [pt(i)] =

(1 )(1 )
P1
t=0 
t2t .
Using the market clearing condition ct = yt as well as the denition of /ct, we obtain
equation (17) in the main text.
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Figure 1: Impulse responses of selected variables under optimal discretionary
policy to a one percent cost-push shock for three cases: (i) New Keynesian; (ii)
Fuhrers specication; and (iii) Multiplicative habits.
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Figure 2: Impulse responses of selected variables under optimal discretionary
policy to a unitary demand shock for three cases: (i) NewKeynesian; (ii) Fuhrers
specication; and (iii) Multiplicative habits.
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Figure 3: Impulse responses of selected variables under optimal commitment
policy to a one percent cost-push shock for three cases: (i) New Keynesian; (ii)
Fuhrers specication; and (iii) Multiplicative habits.
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Figure 4: Impulse responses of selected variables under optimal commitment
policy to a unitary demand shock for three cases: (i) NewKeynesian; (ii) Fuhrers
specication; and (iii) Multiplicative habits.
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